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Question	7.	How	are	emotions	regulated	by	context	and	cognition?	Emotion	regulation	as	a	change	of	goals	and	priorities	Carien	M.	van	Reekum	and	Tom	Johnstone	At	first	glance,	the	notion	of	“emotion	regulation”	seems	intuitive	and	distinct	from	“emotion”	per	se.	When	asking	someone	to	describe	what	they	think	emotion	regulation	is,	some	notion	of	“controlling”	the	emotion	or	“changing”	the	emotion	as	a	function	of	the	context	is	often	brought	forth.	However,	the	differentiation	between	“emotion”	or	“emotion	reactivity”	and	“emotion	regulation”	is	in	fact	tricky.	In	classes	and	empirical	work,	we	often	quote	Thompson’s	(1994)	definition	of	emotion	regulation:	"Emotion	regulation	consists	of	the	extrinsic	and	intrinsic	processes	responsible	for	monitoring,	evaluating,	and	modifying	emotional	reactions,	especially	their	intensive	and	temporal	features,	to	accomplish	one's	goals"	(p.	27-28).		Put	more	simply:	regulation	refers	to	a	process,	different	from	the	original	one	that	elicited	the	emotion	in	the	first	place,	that	changes	the	original	emotion.	The	latter	part	is	the	crux	of	the	issue:	As	we	often	discuss	with	our	students,	when	does	the	reactivity	stop	and	the	regulation	start?	Can	you	distinguish	emotion-generative	processes	from	emotion	regulatory	processes,	especially	when	one	considers	the	emotion	process	to	be	iterative?	This	issue	was	at	the	core	of	a	discussion	between	Gross	et	al.	(2011)	and	Mesquita	and	Frijda	(2011).		The	viewpoint	we	adopt	here	is	that	emotion	regulation	results	from	a	change	of	one’s	goal	(cf.	Mesquita	and	Frijda,	2011),	the	adoption	of	an	additional	goal,	or	a	change	in	the	weighting	or	importance	that	we	assign	to	different	goals.	However,	unlike	Mesquita	and	Frijda,	we	think	that	the	goal	does	not	have	to	be	emotional	in	nature.	Indeed,	sometimes	the	quality	or	intensity	of	emotion	is	changed	due	to	pursuance	of	a	cognitive	or	social	goal	that	is	non-emotional.	Studying	for	an	exam	is	a	good	example,	whereby	anxiety	experienced	at	the	thought	of	failure	may	get	in	the	way	of	the	cognitive	processes	required	for	learning	the	course	material.	Emotion	regulatory	processes	then	consist	of	prioritising	the	goal	of	“learning	the	course	material”,	and	attempting	to	block	out	thoughts	about	one’s	ability	to	perform	in	the	exam	hall.	A	variety	of	experimental	paradigms	have	been	applied	to	understanding	emotion	regulatory	processes,	with	a	considerable	increase	since	the	early	2000s.	In	what	follows,	we	review	a	few	such	paradigms,	and	discuss	where	these	paradigms	“sit”	within	the	framework	of	emotion	regulation.		A	frequently	employed	paradigm,	firstly	developed	by	James	Gross	and	colleagues	(e.g.	Gross,	1998)	and	adopted	by	many	since	including	us,	is	that	of	instructed	emotion	regulation.	The	paradigm	consists	of	instructing	participants	to	employ	one	of	several	strategies	to	change	their	emotion	in	a	given	direction	(most	commonly	decreasing	negative	emotions,	though	increasing	both	positive	and	negative	emotions	has	also	been	examined	in	some	studies).	Strategies	for	emotion	regulation	have	included	reappraising	the	emotion-eliciting	stimulus	by	reframing	the	meaning	in	a	more	positive	or	less	negative	light,	distancing	oneself	from	the	object	of	the	emotion	(e.g.	“the	situation	is	not	real	or	does	not	concern	me”),	shifting	one’s	attention	to	different	aspects	of	the	situation	or	context,	as	well	as	response-focussed	regulation	such	as	suppressing	the	
(expressive)	reactions	to	an	emotion-eliciting	stimulus.	Typically,	conditions	in	which	participants	are	asked	to	invoke	one	of	these	strategies	are	compared	to	a	“respond	naturally”	condition.	Over	the	years,	researchers	have	demonstrated	the	efficacy	of	reappraisal	in	reducing	negative	emotional	responses	(e.g.	Jackson,	Malmstadt,	Larson,	&	Davidson,	2000;	Hajcak	&	Nieuwenhuis,	2006),	that	suppression	may	be	less	effective	than	reappraisal	in	dampening	negative	and	positive	emotion	(e.g.	Kalokerinos,	Greenaway,	&	Denson,	2015)	and	can	have	negative	social	consequences	(e.g.	English	&	John,	2013),	and	that	attentional	shifts	might	explain	differences	in	how	effectively	individuals	are	able	to	regulate	their	emotions	(van	Reekum	et	al.,	2007).	Since	the	early	2000s,	brain	imaging	research	has	provided	insights	into	the	neural	pathways	underlying	successful	employment	of	reappraisal	(Ochsner,	Bunge,	Gross,	&	Gabrieli,	2002;	Schaefer	et	al.,	2002;	see	Buhle	et	al.,	2014,	and	Frank	et	al.,	2014,	for	recent	meta-analyses),	and	highlighted	differences	in	the	processes	underlying	reappraisal	in	clinical	populations	(e.g.	Johnstone,	van	Reekum,	Urry,	Kalin,	&	Davidson,	2007;	Ball,	Ramsawh,	Campbell-Sills,	Paulus,	&	Stein,	2013)	and	those	at	risk	for	psychopathology	(e.g.	Erk	et	al.,	2010;	Uchida	et	al.,	2015).		Instructed	emotion	regulation	paradigms	are	useful	in	examining	the	ability	of	individuals	to	change	the	emotional	response	elicited	by	a	stimulus	or	event	when	given	a	specific	regulatory	strategy.	At	the	same	time,	experimental	and	conceptual	issues	limit	our	ability	to	examine	the	regulatory	processes	with	a	high	degree	of	specificity.	A	major	issue	is	knowing	what	the	person	is	“doing”	when	instructed	to,	for	instance,	think	of	a	less	negative	outcome	for	a	picture	depicting	a	car	crash,	or	a	mutilated	body	part.	Are	they	following	instructions	to	use	reappraisal?	And	if	they	are,	is	that	the	only	thing	they	are	doing?	As	highlighted	by	our	findings	employing	pictures	to	elicit	negative	affect	(van	Reekum	et	al.,	2007),	when	people	are	instructed	to	reappraise	an	image,	they	also	change	the	way	that	they	visually	scan	the	image.	So	the	extent	to	which	changes	to	emotional	responses	are	attributable	to	the	putative	regulatory	mechanism	is	not	known.	One	can	attempt	to	control	for	such	confounds	with	appropriate	measures	(cf.	van	Reekum	et	al.,	2007)	but	a	better	approach	is	to	explicitly	manipulate	them	(e.g.	Urry,	2010).	Another	issue,	one	that	has	been	with	emotion	research	for	decades,	is	that	self-report	is	often	the	sole	dependent	measure	of	emotion	regulatory	outcome.	In	instructed	emotion	regulation	paradigms,	there	is	no	attempt	to	disguise	the	purpose	of	the	experimental	instructions.	When	explicitly	instructed	to	reappraise	a	stimulus	in	such	a	way	as	to	make	it	less	emotional,	isn’t	it	obvious	that	many	people	will	subsequently	rate	their	subjective	feeling	state	as	less	emotional?	The	use	of	emotional	response	measures	that	are	less	prone	to	demand	characteristics	is	imperative	in	supporting	any	claims	that	the	wilful	employment	of	regulatory	strategies	changes	the	emotional	response.	In	any	case,	emotion	is	comprised	of	a	multitude	of	components,	all	of	which	deserve	the	attention	of	the	emotion	regulation	researcher.	Self-report	of	subjective	feeling	should	enjoy	no	privileged	status.		A	further	issue	often	underappreciated	in	instructed	emotion	regulation	studies	is	how	the	choice	of	the	control	condition	can	influence	the	results	and	their	interpretation.	To	use	the	example	of	reappraisal	of	negative	emotion,	how	many	studies	have	compared	a	reappraisal	condition	designed	to	reduce	negative	
emotion	with	a	reappraisal	condition	designed	to	be	emotionally	irrelevant?	Studies	that	have	included	an	“increase”	as	well	as	a	“decrease”	condition	go	some	way	to	addressing	this	problem.	Still,	only	by	using	an	equally	demanding,	carefully	matched,	neutral	reappraisal	control	can	we	be	sure	that	a	reduction	in	emotional	response	is	due	to	specific	reappraisal	goals,	and	not	the	automatic	dampening	effect	that	any	evaluative	process	might	have	on	emotional	responding.		A	final	issue	to	consider,	particularly	in	studies	that	examine	individual	differences,	is	that	emotional	responses	in	the	control	condition	might	already	be	regulated	by	some	of	the	participants,	even	if	not	deliberately	so.	Indeed,	in	most	laboratory	settings,	some	form	of	regulation	likely	intrinsically	occurs,	given	the	presence	of	an	experimenter	and	that	the	participants	know	that	their	responses	are	recorded.	Emotion	is	a	process	in	which	a	continuous	re-evaluation	of	our	environment	and	our	goals	leads	to	updating	of	our	emotional	responses.	Why	should	the	outcome	of	one	such	evaluation	be	considered	“response”	and	another	“regulation”?	Yet	it	does	seem	useful	to	distinguish	between	one’s	initial	emotional	response	to	a	situation	and	how	one	subsequently	can	modify	that	response.	One	possible	way	to	address	this	issue	at	a	psychological	level	of	description	is	to	make	a	distinction	between	intrinsic	or	spontaneous	regulation,	as	opposed	to	wilful,	or	deliberate	regulation	(see	also	Gyurak,	Gross,	&	Etkin,	2011).	Alternatively,	at	a	neural	level	of	description	it	might	be	possible	to	separate	emotional	responses	from	regulation	of	those	responses,	though	even	that	turns	out	to	be	less	clear	than	one	might	think	(see	Question	4).			The	empirical	study	of	“intrinsic”	or	“spontaneous”	regulation	can	be	achieved	in	different,	more	constrained,	ways,	however.	One	way	is	to	affect	the	task	goal	or	context	within	which	an	emotional	stimulus	is	presented:	A	participant	can	be	asked	to	complete	a	non-emotional	task	(e.g.	a	working	memory	task)	while	at	the	same	being	exposed	to	emotional	stimuli	that	serve	as	task-irrelevant	distractors.	In	this	case,	the	participant	is	not	explicitly	told	to	instigate,	or	change,	a	regulatory	goal	with	respect	to	the	emotional	state	or	stimulus,	but	is	provided	with	a	different	goal	-	that	of	performing	in	a	cognitive	task	-	that	requires	dampening	of	any	emotional	response	to	the	distractor	stimulus,	particularly	as	task	demand	increases.	For	example,	Clarke	&	Johnstone	(2013)	asked	participants	to	perform	a	visuospatial	N-back	task	under	threat	of	electric	shock	designed	to	elicit	anxiety	(see	also	Shackman	et	al.,	2006).	In	the	low	cognitive	load	(2-back)	condition,	threat	of	shock	was	found	to	interfere	with	task	performance,	but	this	interference	was	not	seen	for	the	3-back	condition.	Brain	imaging	and	psychophysiological	measures	indicated	that	this	was	the	result	of	recruitment	of	prefrontal	cortical	regulation	systems	in	the	high	cognitive	load	condition.	A	number	of	studies	have	applied	similar	paradigms	to	show	that	under	high	cognitive	load,	individuals	can	reduce	or	eliminate	interference	by	a	variety	of	emotional	distractors	(e.g.	Van	Dillen,	Heslenfeld,	&	Koole,	2009;	Uher,	Brooks,	Bartholdy,	Tchanturia,	&	Campbell,	2014).	An	interesting	question	arising	from	such	studies	is	what	is	actually	being	regulated?	Although	interference	of	emotional	distractors	on	a	cognitive	task	is	reduced,	other	indicators	of	emotional	response	(e.g.	autonomic	responses)	may	not	be.	The	components	of	an	emotional	response	that	are	regulated	might	depend	very	much	on	the	specific	context.	
Another	example	of	the	spontaneous	regulation	of	emotional	responses	is	fear	extinction.	Extinction	of	learned	fear	is	considered	an	active	process	that	involves	the	learning	of	a	new	association	that	competes	with	the	one	stored	in	memory	during	acquisition	(e.g.	Pearce	&	Hall,	1980;	see	also	Vurbic	&	Bouton,	2014),	which	differs	from	older	accounts	emphasising	the	weakening	of	previously	learned	associations	through	repeated	presentations	of	non-reinforced	CS+.	In	terms	of	the	underlying	processes,	fear	extinction	is	relatively	well	understood.	The	consistency	with	which	areas	in	ventromedial	prefrontal	cortex	(VMPFC)	are	involved	in	fear	extinction	across	animals	(e.g.	Milad	&	Quirk,	2002)	and	humans	(Phelps,	Delgado,	Nearing,	&	LeDoux,	2004;	see	also	VanElzakker,	Kathryn	Dahlgren,	Caroline	Davis,	Dubois,	&	Shin,	2014	for	a	review)	indicates	the	central	role	this	area	plays	in	the	flexible	assignment	of	value	to	stimuli	or	context,	biasing	activation	in	the	amygdala.	Neuroimaging	findings	underscore	the	functional	overlap	in	neural	circuitry	underlying	extinction	of	conditioned	fear,	reversal	of	fear	conditioning	and	voluntary	regulation	of	learned	fear	(Schiller	&	Delgado,	2010)	including	the	VMPFC.	The	overlap	would	suggest	that	at	least	some	processes	are	shared	across	these	3	fear-modulatory	strategies.	Indeed,	recent	evidence	obtained	from	lesion	patients	suggests	that	the	VMPFC	plays	a	crucial	role	in	the	regulation	of	amygdala	activity	(Motzkin,	Philippi,	Wolf,	Baskaya,	&	Koenigs,	2015).	The	well-demarcated	crucial	part	of	the	network,	a	solid	grasp	on	the	processes	involved	in	extinction,	and	the	relevance	to	psychological	treatment,	renders	fear	extinction	useful	to	the	study	of	psychopathology,	particularly	PTSD	and	anxiety.	Recent	findings	from	our	laboratory	suggest	that	intolerance	of	uncertainty,	a	component	of	anxiety,	is	associated	with	the	ability	to	recruit	VMPFC	during	extinction.	This	relationship	holds	after	controlling	for	general	trait	anxiety	(Morriss,	Christakou,	&	van	Reekum,	2015).	Despite	their	importance,	however,	conditioning	paradigms	are	limited	to	the	study	of	regulation	of	a	relatively	small	set	of	affective	states.	Finally,	the	study	of	the	time	course	of	emotional	processes,	or	“affective	chronometry”,	a	term	first	coined	by	Davidson	(1998),	is	relevant	to	questions	concerning	what	constitutes	emotion	regulation	(see	also	Kuppens	&	Verduyn,	2015).	Whereas	the	dynamics	of	emotional	processes	have	been	under	study	in	the	past	using	self-report	(e.g.	Sonnemans	&	Frijda,	1994;	Verduyn,	Delvaux,	Van	Coillie,	Tuerlinckx,	&	Van	Mechelen,	2009),	psychophysiological	responses	(e.g.	van	Reekum	et	al.,	2004)	and	ERP	(e.g.	Schupp	et	al.,	2000),	the	focus	in	past	work	has	been	on	the	time	course	of	emotion-eliciting	processes	and	overall	duration,	rather	than	on	the	time	course	of	the	termination	of	emotion	(but	see	Sonnemans	&	Frijda,	1994,	for	an	early	assessment	of	how	felt	intensity	and	duration	are	modulated	by	emotion	“ending”	processes	including	active	regulation).	More	recently,	the	study	of	“emotional	recovery”	-	that	is	the	time	it	takes	for	an	emotional	response	to	reduce	to	a	relative	baseline	after	reaching	it’s	nadir	-	is	rightfully	gaining	more	attention	in	the	field.	Two	approaches	to	study	emotional	recovery	have	proven	informative:	The	first	provides	information	about	how	the	various	components	of	emotions	demonstrate	continued	modulation	by	emotion-relevant	stimuli	after	the	offset	of	the	stimuli,	and	the	second	focuses	on	how	individual	differences	in	personality	and	emotional	disposition	predict	the	recovery	from	emotional	challenges.		
With	regard	to	the	first	approach,	several	studies	(Ihssen,	Heim,	&	Keil,	2007;	Weinberg	&	Hajcak,	2011;	Morriss,	Taylor,	Roesch,	&	van	Reekum,	2013)	employed	event-related	potentials	(ERP)	to	demonstrate	disrupted	processing	in	task-relevant	stimuli	presented	up	to	3.5	s	after	the	offset	of	emotionally	arousing	pictures.	Various	psychophysiological	indicators	such	as	the	late	positive	potential	(e.g.	Hajcak	&	Olvet,	2008),	eyeblink	startle	(e.g.	Jackson	et	al.,	2003)	and	corrugator	activity	(e.g.	van	Reekum	et	al.,	2011),	suggest	that	emotional	pictures	continue	to	modulate	responses	between	1	and	5	seconds	after	offset.	Further	work	should	establish	the	extent	to	which	different	emotions	and	the	components	of	each	emotion	may	have	different	recovery	profiles,	including	felt	emotion,	emotional	expressions,	and	bodily	concomitants	of	emotion.	It	will	also	be	necessary	to	augment	lab-based	studies	with	experience	sampling	of	emotions	in	daily	life,	to	determine	how	lab	findings	generalise	to	everyday	experienced	emotions	that	can	stretch	over	minutes,	hours,	even	days.		Emotional	recovery	has	most	commonly	been	studied	in	terms	of	individual	differences	(e.g.	Jackson	et	al.,	2003),	in	an	effort	to	increase	our	understanding	of	how	positive	and	negative	emotional	disposition,	well-being	and	resilience,	age	and	cognitive	reserve,	interpersonal	experience,	and	psychopathology	are	related	to	the	time	course	of	emotional	responding	and	recovery.	Recent	research	has	highlighted	the	utility	of	this	approach:	Marital	stress	has	been	found	to	be	associated	with	shorter-lived	responses	to	positive	pictures	but	was	not	associated	with	reactivity	to	or	recovery	from	negative	pictures	(Lapate	et	al.,	2014).	Advancing	age	was	seen	to	be	related	to	a	slower	recovery	from	a	social-cognitive	stressor	(Wrzus,	Müller,	Wagner,	Lindenberger,	&	Riediger,	2014)	although	this	may	be	situation-dependent,	since	another	study	found	little	effect	of	age-related	differences	in	the	recovery	from	positive	and	negative	pictures	(van	Reekum	et	al.,	2011).	Anxious	apprehension	has	been	associated	with	eyeblink	potentiation	after	the	offset	of	negative	and	positive	pictures,	whilst	anhedonic	depression	was	characterised	by	a	continued	blunted	response	to	positive	pictures	after	picture	offset,	although	no	differences	were	found	between	those	high	in	anhedonic	depression	and	controls	in	the	recovery	from	negative	pictures	(Larson,	Nitschke,	&	Davidson,	2007).	Similarly,	individuals	diagnosed	with	major	depressive	disorder	demonstrated	less	sustained	responding	to	positive	emotional	stimuli	over	time	in	frontostriatal	networks	compared	to	controls	(Heller	et	al.,	2009),	whilst	enhanced	responding	in	this	network	over	time	has	been	associated	with	high	self-reported	psychological	well-being	and	lower	cortisol	output	in	daily	life	(Heller	et	al.,	2013).	In	summary,	these	studies	illustrate	that	variability	in	the	time	course	of	the	emotional	response,	particularly	after	the	offset	of	the	challenge,	is	an	important	factor	in	understanding	emotional	disorder	and	well-being.	Whilst	still	in	its	infancy,	the	study	of	emotional	recovery	can	provide	important	clues	to	psychological	intervention.		All	of	these	forms	of	emotion	regulation	have	one	thing	in	common:	they	all	involve	the	change	of	goals	or	the	way	we	prioritise	different	goals.	We	can	bring	about	this	change	via	deliberate	cognition,	but	in	many	instances	the	change	in	goal	priorities	might	come	about	unconsciously,	as	an	adaptive	response	to	changing	context.			
References:	Ball,	T.	M.,	Ramsawh,	H.	J.,	Campbell-Sills,	L.,	Paulus,	M.	P.,	&	Stein,	M.	B.	(2013).	Prefrontal	dysfunction	during	emotion	regulation	in	generalized	anxiety	and	panic	disorders.	Psychological	Medicine,	43(07),	1475–1486.	http://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291712002383	Buhle,	J.	T.,	Silvers,	J.	A.,	Wager,	T.	D.,	Lopez,	R.,	Onyemekwu,	C.,	Kober,	H.,	…	Ochsner,	K.	N.	(2014).	Cognitive	Reappraisal	of	Emotion:	A	Meta-Analysis	of	Human	Neuroimaging	Studies.	Cerebral	Cortex,	24(11),	2981–2990.	http://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bht154	Clarke,	R.	J.,	&	Johnstone,	T.	(2013).	Prefrontal	inhibition	of	threat	processing	reduces	working	memory	interference.	Frontiers	in	Human	Neuroscience,	
7,	228.	http://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00228	Davidson,	R.	J.	(1998).	Affective	style	and	affective	disorders:	Perspectives	from	affective	neuroscience.	Cognition	&	Emotion,	12(3),	307–330.	English,	T.,	&	John,	O.	P.	(2013).	Understanding	the	social	effects	of	emotion	regulation:	The	mediating	role	of	authenticity	for	individual	differences	in	suppression.	Emotion,	13(2),	314–329.	http://doi.org/10.1037/a0029847	Erk,	S.,	Mikschl,	A.,	Stier,	S.,	Ciaramidaro,	A.,	Gapp,	V.,	Weber,	B.,	&	Walter,	H.	(2010).	Acute	and	Sustained	Effects	of	Cognitive	Emotion	Regulation	in	Major	Depression.	Journal	of	Neuroscience,	30(47),	15726–15734.	http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1856-10.2010	Frank,	D.	W.,	Dewitt,	M.,	Hudgens-Haney,	M.,	Schaeffer,	D.	J.,	Ball,	B.	H.,	Schwarz,	N.	F.,	…	Sabatinelli,	D.	(2014).	Emotion	regulation:	Quantitative	meta-analysis	of	functional	activation	and	deactivation.	Neuroscience	&	
Biobehavioral	Reviews,	45,	202–211.	http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.06.010	Gross,	J.	J.,	Sheppes,	G.,	&	Urry,	H.	L.	(2011).	Cognition	and	Emotion	Lecture	at	the	2010	SPSP	Emotion	Preconference:	Emotion	generation	and	emotion	regulation:	A	distinction	we	should	make	(carefully).	Cognition	&	Emotion,	
25(5),	765–781.	http://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2011.555753	Gyurak,	A.,	Gross,	J.	J.,	&	Etkin,	A.	(2011).	Explicit	and	implicit	emotion	regulation:	A	dual-process	framework.	Cognition	&	Emotion,	25(3),	400–412.	http://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2010.544160	Hajcak,	G.,	&	Nieuwenhuis,	S.	(2006).	Reappraisal	modulates	the	electrocortical	response	to	unpleasant	pictures.	Cognitive,	Affective,	&	Behavioral	
Neuroscience,	6(4),	291–297.	http://doi.org/10.3758/CABN.6.4.291	Hajcak,	G.,	&	Olvet,	D.	M.	(2008).	The	persistence	of	attention	to	emotion:	Brain	potentials	during	and	after	picture	presentation.	Emotion,	8(2),	250–255.	http://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.8.2.250	Heller,	A.	S.,	Johnstone,	T.,	Shackman,	A.	J.,	Light,	S.	N.,	Peterson,	M.	J.,	Kolden,	G.	G.,	…	Davidson,	R.	J.	(2009).	Reduced	capacity	to	sustain	positive	emotion	in	major	depression	reflects	diminished	maintenance	of	fronto-striatal	brain	activation.	Proceedings	of	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences,	106(52),	22445–22450.	http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0910651106	Heller,	A.	S.,	van	Reekum,	C.	M.,	Schaefer,	S.	M.,	Lapate,	R.	C.,	Radler,	B.	T.,	Ryff,	C.	D.,	&	Davidson,	R.	J.	(2013).	Sustained	Striatal	Activity	Predicts	Eudaimonic	Well-Being	and	Cortisol	Output.	Psychological	Science,	24(11),	2191–2200.	http://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613490744	
Ihssen,	N.,	Heim,	S.,	&	Keil,	A.	(2007).	The	Costs	of	Emotional	Attention:	Affective	Processing	Inhibits	Subsequent	Lexico-semantic	Analysis.	Journal	of	
Cognitive	Neuroscience,	19(12),	1932–1949.	http://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2007.19.12.1932	Jackson,	D.	C.,	Malmstadt,	J.	R.,	Larson,	C.	L.,	&	Davidson,	R.	J.	(2000).	Suppression	and	enhancement	of	emotional	responses	to	unpleasant	pictures.	
Psychophysiology,	37(04),	515–522.	http://doi.org/null	Jackson,	D.	C.,	Mueller,	C.	J.,	Dolski,	I.,	Dalton,	K.	M.,	Nitschke,	J.	B.,	Urry,	H.	L.,	…	Davidson,	R.	J.	(2003).	Now	you	feel	it,	now	you	don’t:	frontal	brain	electrical	asymmetry	and	individual	differences	in	emotion	regulation.	
Psychological	Science,	14(6),	612–617.	http://doi.org/10.1046/j.0956-7976.2003.psci_1473.x	Johnstone,	T.,	van	Reekum,	C.	M.,	Urry,	H.	L.,	Kalin,	N.	H.,	&	Davidson,	R.	J.	(2007).	Failure	to	regulate:	counterproductive	recruitment	of	top-down	prefrontal-subcortical	circuitry	in	major	depression.	The	Journal	of	
Neuroscience,	27(33),	8877.	Kalokerinos,	E.	K.,	Greenaway,	K.	H.,	&	Denson,	T.	F.	(2015).	Reappraisal	but	not	suppression	downregulates	the	experience	of	positive	and	negative	emotion.	Emotion,	15(3),	271–275.	http://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000025	Kuppens,	P.,	&	Verduyn,	P.	(2015).	Looking	at	Emotion	Regulation	Through	the	Window	of	Emotion	Dynamics.	Psychological	Inquiry,	26(1),	72–79.	http://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2015.960505	Lapate,	R.	C.,	van	Reekum,	C.	M.,	Schaefer,	S.	M.,	Greischar,	L.	L.,	Norris,	C.	J.,	Bachhuber,	D.	R.	W.,	…	Davidson,	R.	J.	(2014).	Prolonged	marital	stress	is	associated	with	short-lived	responses	to	positive	stimuli:	Marital	stress	positive	affect.	Psychophysiology,	51(6),	499–509.	http://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.12203	Larson,	C.	L.,	Nitschke,	J.	B.,	&	Davidson,	R.	J.	(2007).	Common	and	distinct	patterns	of	affective	response	in	dimensions	of	anxiety	and	depression.	
Emotion,	7(1),	182–191.	http://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.7.1.182	Mesquita,	B.,	&	Frijda,	N.	H.	(2011).	An	emotion	perspective	on	emotion	regulation.	Cognition	&	Emotion,	25(5),	782–784.	http://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2011.586824	Milad,	M.	R.,	&	Quirk,	G.	J.	(2002).	Neurons	in	medial	prefrontal	cortex	signal	memory	for	fear	extinction.	Nature,	420(6911),	70–74.	http://doi.org/10.1038/nature01138	Morriss,	J.,	Christakou,	A.,	&	van	Reekum,	C.	M.	(2015).	Intolerance	of	uncertainty	predicts	fear	extinction	in	amygdala-ventromedial	prefrontal	cortical	circuitry.	Biology	of	Mood	&	Anxiety	Disorders,	5(1).	http://doi.org/10.1186/s13587-015-0019-8	Morriss,	J.,	Taylor,	A.	N.	W.,	Roesch,	E.	B.,	&	van	Reekum,	C.	M.	(2013).	Still	feeling	it:	the	time	course	of	emotional	recovery	from	an	attentional	perspective.	
Frontiers	in	Human	Neuroscience,	7.	http://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00201	Motzkin,	J.	C.,	Philippi,	C.	L.,	Wolf,	R.	C.,	Baskaya,	M.	K.,	&	Koenigs,	M.	(2015).	Ventromedial	Prefrontal	Cortex	Is	Critical	for	the	Regulation	of	Amygdala	Activity	in	Humans.	Biological	Psychiatry,	77(3),	276–284.	http://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2014.02.014	
Ochsner,	K.	N.,	Bunge,	S.	A.,	Gross,	J.	J.,	&	Gabrieli,	J.	D.	E.	(2002).	Rethinking	feelings:	An	fMRI	study	of	the	cognitive	regulation	of	emotion.	Journal	of	
Cognitive	Neuroscience,	14(8),	1215–1229.	Pearce,	J.	M.,	&	Hall,	G.	(1980).	A	model	for	Pavlovian	learning:	Variations	in	the	effectiveness	of	conditioned	but	not	of	unconditioned	stimuli.	
Psychological	Review,	87(6),	532–552.	http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.87.6.532	Phelps,	E.	A.,	Delgado,	M.	R.,	Nearing,	K.	I.,	&	LeDoux,	J.	E.	(2004).	Extinction	Learning	in	Humans:	Role	of	the	Amygdala	and	vmPFC.	Neuron,	43(6),	897–905.	http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2004.08.042	Schaefer,	S.	M.,	Jackson,	D.	C.,	Davidson,	R.	J.,	Aguirre,	G.	K.,	Kimberg,	D.	Y.,	&	Thompson-Schill,	S.	L.	(2002).	Modulation	of	amygdalar	activity	by	the	conscious	regulation	of	negative	emotion.	Journal	of	Cognitive	
Neuroscience,	14(6),	913–921.	Schiller,	D.,	&	Delgado,	M.	R.	(2010).	Overlapping	neural	systems	mediating	extinction,	reversal	and	regulation	of	fear.	Trends	in	Cognitive	Sciences,	
14(6),	268–276.	http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2010.04.002	Schupp,	H.	T.,	Cuthbert,	B.	N.,	Bradley,	M.	M.,	Cacioppo,	J.	T.,	Ito,	T.,	&	Lang,	P.	J.	(2000).	Affective	picture	processing:	The	late	positive	potential	is	modulated	by	motivational	relevance.	Psychophysiology,	37(2),	257–261.	http://doi.org/10.1111/1469-8986.3720257	Shackman,	A.	J.,	Sarinopoulos,	I.,	Maxwell,	J.	S.,	Pizzagalli,	D.	A.,	Lavric,	A.,	&	Davidson,	R.	J.	(2006).	Anxiety	selectively	disrupts	visuospatial	working	memory.	Emotion,	6(1),	40–61.	http://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.6.1.40	Sonnemans,	J.,	&	Frijda,	N.	H.	(1994).	The	structure	of	subjective	emotional	intensity.	Cognition	&	Emotion,	8(4),	329–350.	http://doi.org/10.1080/02699939408408945	Thompson,	R.	A.	(1994).	Emotion	regulation:	a	theme	in	search	of	definition.	
Monographs	of	the	Society	for	Research	in	Child	Development,	59(2-3),	25–52.	Uchida,	M.,	Biederman,	J.,	Gabrieli,	J.	D.	E.,	Micco,	J.,	de	Los	Angeles,	C.,	Brown,	A.,	…	Whitfield-Gabrieli,	S.	(2015).	Emotion	regulation	ability	varies	in	relation	to	intrinsic	functional	brain	architecture.	Social	Cognitive	and	
Affective	Neuroscience,	nsv059.	http://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsv059	Uher,	R.,	Brooks,	S.	J.,	Bartholdy,	S.,	Tchanturia,	K.,	&	Campbell,	I.	C.	(2014).	Increasing	Cognitive	Load	Reduces	Interference	from	Masked	Appetitive	and	Aversive	but	Not	Neutral	Stimuli.	PLoS	ONE,	9(4),	e94417.	http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0094417	Urry,	H.	L.	(2010).	Seeing,	thinking,	and	feeling:	Emotion-regulating	effects	of	gaze-directed	cognitive	reappraisal.	Emotion,	10(1),	125–135.	http://doi.org/10.1037/a0017434	Van	Dillen,	L.	F.,	Heslenfeld,	D.	J.,	&	Koole,	S.	L.	(2009).	Tuning	down	the	emotional	brain:	An	fMRI	study	of	the	effects	of	cognitive	load	on	the	processing	of	affective	images.	NeuroImage,	45(4),	1212–1219.	http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.01.016	VanElzakker,	M.	B.,	Kathryn	Dahlgren,	M.,	Caroline	Davis,	F.,	Dubois,	S.,	&	Shin,	L.	M.	(2014).	From	Pavlov	to	PTSD:	The	extinction	of	conditioned	fear	in	rodents,	humans,	and	anxiety	disorders.	Neurobiology	of	Learning	and	
Memory,	113,	3–18.	http://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlm.2013.11.014	
van	Reekum,	C.	M.,	Johnstone,	T.,	Banse,	R.,	Etter,	A.,	Wehrle,	T.,	&	Scherer,	K.	R.	(2004).	Psychophysiological	responses	to	appraisal	dimensions	in	a	computer	game.	Cognition	&	Emotion,	18(5),	663–688.	van	Reekum,	C.	M.,	Johnstone,	T.,	Urry,	H.	L.,	Thurow,	M.	E.,	Schaefer,	H.	S.,	Alexander,	A.	L.,	&	Davidson,	R.	J.	(2007).	Gaze	fixations	predict	brain	activation	during	the	voluntary	regulation	of	picture-induced	negative	affect.	Neuroimage,	36(3),	1041–1055.	van	Reekum,	C.	M.,	Schaefer,	S.	M.,	Lapate,	R.	C.,	Norris,	C.	J.,	Greischar,	L.	L.,	&	Davidson,	R.	J.	(2011).	Aging	is	associated	with	positive	responding	to	neutral	information	but	reduced	recovery	from	negative	information.	
Social	Cognitive	and	Affective	Neuroscience,	6(2),	177–185.	http://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsq031	Verduyn,	P.,	Delvaux,	E.,	Van	Coillie,	H.,	Tuerlinckx,	F.,	&	Van	Mechelen,	I.	(2009).	Predicting	the	duration	of	emotional	experience:	Two	experience	sampling	studies.	Emotion,	9(1),	83–91.	http://doi.org/10.1037/a0014610	Vurbic,	D.,	&	Bouton,	M.	E.	(2014).	A	Contemporary	Behavioral	Perspective	on	Extinction.	In	F.	K.	McSweeney	&	E.	S.	Murphy	(Eds.),	The	Wiley	Blackwell	
Handbook	of	Operant	and	Classical	Conditioning	(pp.	53–76).	Oxford,	UK:	John	Wiley	&	Sons,	Ltd.	Retrieved	from	http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/9781118468135.ch3	Weinberg,	A.,	&	Hajcak,	G.	(2011).	The	Late	Positive	Potential	Predicts	Subsequent	Interference	with	Target	Processing.	Journal	of	Cognitive	
Neuroscience,	23(10),	2994–3007.	http://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2011.21630	Wrzus,	C.,	Müller,	V.,	Wagner,	G.	G.,	Lindenberger,	U.,	&	Riediger,	M.	(2014).	Affect	dynamics	across	the	lifespan:	With	age,	heart	rate	reacts	less	strongly,	but	recovers	more	slowly	from	unpleasant	emotional	situations.	Psychology	
and	Aging,	29(3),	563–576.	http://doi.org/10.1037/a0037451		
